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Trudo Lemmens and Andrew Flavelle Martin 
In 2004, more than a decade after a Royal Commission report urged the government to 
regulate the legal, ethical, and social issues associated with assisted human reproduction (AHR), 
the Parliament of Canada adopted the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA).1 The Act had 
four main components: a set of strict prohibitions; a regulatory framework surrounding specific 
AHR practices; privacy rules related to AHR; and provisions related to a new Assisted Human 
Reproduction Agency of Canada. The final scope of the prohibitions had changed considerably 
throughout the various drafting processes, in line with emerging technologies that were not yet 
developed at the time the Royal Commission tabled its report. The Act included strict 
prohibitions on activities such as cloning, the creation of embryos for research, and the creation 
of chimeras. Other activities were surrounded by both prohibitions and regulatory restrictions. 
The commercial sale of human reproductive materials and surrogacy, for example, was 
prohibited, while compensation for reasonable expenses incurred as part of these activities was to 
be regulated. The Act also created a framework for the development of further regulations and 
the licensing of virtually all AHR services. To implement this framework, the Act established the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada and mandated the agency to review and 
regulate a panoply of issues associated with the rapid changes in assisted human reproduction 
technology. 
The Act faced criticism from the moment of its enactment. Commentators raised several 
concerns, particularly about the use of the criminal law and the strict prohibitions on some 
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activities. Criticism was especially strong from the research community with regard to the 
restrictions on research, such as the prohibition on the creation of chimeras. The original purpose 
of the Act had been primarily to regulate reproductive services; the debate around the use of the 
criminal law became primarily a debate about the alleged lack of flexibility of the criminal law in 
adjusting to scientific developments. Some criticized also the prohibition on the 
commercialization of gametes and surrogacy. The legislative scheme introduced in Canada was, 
however, not unique, as several countries had enacted legislation on AHR around the same time, 
with similarly combined prohibitions on some activities, strict regulation of others, and the 
establishment of a regulatory or review authority. The stark contrast between the Canadian 
regulatory approach and the largely unregulated market for assisted human reproduction in the 
United States generated additional pressure on the Canadian system. However, it was the 
traditional and limited question of federalism – the division of authority between the federal and 
provincial governments – that ultimately had the most significant impact on the future of the 
regulatory approach. 
In 2008, the Province of Quebec challenged several provisions of the Act, in particular 
those related to the regulation of assisted human reproductive activities, as an inappropriate 
intrusion on provincial jurisdiction over the regulation of health services and facilities.2 In 2010, 
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down key provisions of the Act as being outside federal 
jurisdiction, including those that restricted the manipulation and use of gametes and embryos to 
people and premises licensed by the Agency.3 This decision hollowed out much of the regulatory 
apparatus in the Act and dramatically reduced the role of the Agency, which was later abolished. 
As a result, both the federal government and the provinces are back at the drawing board, having 
to reimagine how AHR could and should be regulated in Canada. The federal government’s 
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response has been limited. It has abolished the regulatory agency that was supposed to be in 
charge of implementing the regulatory scheme, and it has not enacted any regulations, which it is 
still empowered to do under the provisions that have remained in place. AAAA 
This book explores a range of legal, policy, and ethical issues in the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. Several of the chapters were presented in earlier versions at a 
conference at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in October 2011. Leading Canadian and 
international scholars reflect not only on the decision itself but also on diverse issues such as the 
potential exploitation of surrogates; the impact on women’s health of AHR and of the harvesting 
of eggs; the commodification of human life; the societal implications of market-oriented 
reproduction; the dignity of women, infertile couples, and offspring; and the role of law and 
policy in ensuring access to AHR without discrimination. Some chapters analyse the decision 
itself as a development in federalism, including the scope of the federal power over criminal law 
and provincial jurisdiction over health care. Other chapters consider unanswered questions about 
the legal impact of AHR on children and families, particularly in terms of legal parentage and 
gamete donor anonymity. Finally, some chapters consider the implications of the decision – and 
particularly the judges’ differing views of the proper role for the criminal law – for the 
commercialization of human reproductive services, the commodification of human reproductive 
materials, and the allocation and availability of these services and materials. All of these chapters 
reflect in one way or another on the daunting challenge faced by legislatures and courts in 
responding to the often unforeseeable and at this point perhaps still unimaginable possibilities 
created by new technologies; the difficulty in reassessing previously accurate ideas and 
assumptions about the nature of the division of powers, parenthood, and reproduction itself; and 
the challenge in regulating activities where often very divergent ethical norms, social values, and 
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economic interests intersect. This challenge has been addressed wisely in some respects and 
poorly in others, and simply ignored in the rest. 
This book provides timely reflection on many of the issues both federal and provincial 
legislators will face. To inform the Canadian debate, several of the international commentators 
reflect on how other jurisdictions – such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand – deal with some aspects of AHR regulation. In addition, the book pays special attention 
to the changing international context in which AHR services occur. Since the adoption of the 
Act, AHR has been developing at a very fast pace at a global scale, in a complex social, medical, 
and industrial context. The global context has brought new issues to the fore, with concerns 
about reproductive tourism and its social, ethical, and legal implications. Foreign surrogacy and 
AHR services involving foreign donated sperm and ova, for example, raise complex questions 
about the applicability of national rules related to family law and immigration. People travel to 
obtain access to gametes or to use surrogates in countries that allow the practice. Also, people 
from outside Canada are using Canadian clinics for AHR procedures on themselves or on 
surrogates. The commercial interests of AHR clinics, sperm and ova banks, and other industries 
with financial stakes in the promotion of AHR – many of them operating internationally – also 
create special challenges and conflicts of interest. 
The AHRA, the Reference, and Subsequent 
Developments 
The AHRA was the fourth federal bill attempting to govern assisted human reproduction 
in the wake of the 1993 final report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
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Technologies.4 The bill was introduced in February 2004 and received Royal Assent in March of 
that year. Parts came into force in 2004, 2006, and 2007; other sections were never proclaimed. 
As mentioned above, the Act prohibited many activities outright and allowed others 
subject to licensure and other limitations. The key prohibitions included those against creating 
and using embryos for research purposes, combining human and non-human cells, cloning, and 
sex selection; payment for surrogacy or gametes, and any surrogacy by persons under 21; using 
gametes or an embryo without the contributor’s consent; and using the gametes of persons under 
eighteen for any purpose other than creating a child to be raised by those persons. The regulated 
activities included the creation or implantation of embryos, as well as the import, export, or 
transfer of gametes and embryos; the combination of human and non-human genetic material; 
and the reimbursement of expenses for gamete contributors or surrogates. Licences were 
required for the persons providing AHR services and the premises in which they did so. The act 
also established a specialized regime of privacy and access to information for assisted 
reproduction records and a specialized agency to perform the licensure and information 
functions. 
The government of Quebec’s legal challenge to parts of the AHRA began as a reference 
application to the Quebec Court of Appeal. Of the prohibitions, Quebec challenged only those on 
the use of gametes or embryos with the contributors’ consent and the use of gametes from 
persons under eighteen to create a child for another person. Quebec challenged all of the 
provisions on regulated activities and privacy and access to information, as well as related 
ancillary sections of the AHRA. Quebec’s argument was that these sections “regulate[d] the 
entire field of medicine relating to assisted procreation,”5 which was a function for the provinces, 
given that they had jurisdiction over health care. Canada argued, unsuccessfully, that all of these 
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provisions were valid exercises of the federal power over criminal law. The Court of Appeal, in a 
unanimous decision by a panel of three judges, held that all of the sections challenged by the 
government of Quebec were ultra vires the Parliament of Canada; the court agreed that, aside 
from the outright prohibitions, “the Act constitutes a complete code governing all clinical and 
research activities relating to assisted reproduction.”6 
The federal government appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Canada. Two 
provinces and various other groups intervened on the appeal. The nine judges who heard the 
appeal issued three sets of reasons: one by McLachlin CJ for a total of four judges, one by LeBel 
and Dechamps JJ for a total of four judges, and one by Cromwell J for himself alone. Chief 
Justice McLachlin held that the challenged provisions were aimed at preventing moral harm as 
well as public health ills and security issues and were thus properly criminal law within the 
jurisdiction of Parliament: 
Assisted reproduction raises weighty moral concerns. The creation of 
human life and the processes by which it is altered and extinguished, as well as 
the impact this may have on affected parties, lie at the heart of morality. 
Parliament has a strong interest in ensuring that basic moral standards govern the 
creation and destruction of life, as well as their impact on persons like donors and 
mothers. Taken as a whole, the Act seeks to avert serious damage to the fabric of 
our society by prohibiting practices that tend to devalue human life and degrade 
participants. This is a valid criminal law purpose, grounded in issues that our 
society considers to be of fundamental importance.7 
In contrast, LeBel and Deschamps JJ held that the provisions constituted regulation of 
health services, a provincial responsibility: “the purpose and the effects of the provisions in 
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question relate to the regulation of a specific type of health services provided in health-care 
institutions by health-care professionals to individuals who for pathological or physiological 
reasons need help to reproduce.”8 They held that “[n]othing in the record suggests that the 
controlled activities should be regarded as conduct that is reprehensible or represents a serious 
risk to morality, safety or public health.”9 Justice Cromwell broke the tie, agreeing largely but 
not entirely with Lebel and Deschamps JJ. His holding, and thus the result, was that some 
sections – most importantly, those on the licensure of professionals and premises for the delivery 
of AHR services and the privacy and information regime – were ultra vires, whereas others – 
particularly the prohibitions on using gametes or embryos without consent, the restriction on the 
use of minors’ gametes, and the provisions allowing reimbursement of expenses but not payment 
– were not. 
In 2012, Parliament passed a series of amendments to the AHRA.10 These repealed 
several sections, primarily those held to be ultra vires, and abolished the Agency and the 
licensure apparatus. Also, a new section was added that established safety standards for sperm 
and ova.11 
Since the Supreme Court judgment, some other important legal developments have taken 
place in the context of AHR, which relate to a lively topic of discussion at the conference, and 
which are further developed in this book. Between 2008 and 2012, around the same time as the 
AHRA Reference and subsequent amendments, the case of Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney 
General) was winding its way through the courts.12 Olivia Pratten argued that persons born 
through AHR had a constitutional right to information about their progenitors under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.13 She argued that such a right had been created both 
through section 7 (which recognizes the right to not be deprived of life, liberty, or security of the 
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person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice) and section 15 (which 
protects against discrimination). More specifically, she claimed that the lack of information 
violated her liberty and security by endangering her health and undermining her very identity, 
and that it was discriminatory to provide similar information to adopted persons but not to 
persons born through gamete donation. Pratten was successful in 2011 at first instance on the 
section 15 claim, but the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge in 2012, and the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 2013 refused leave to appeal. At the time of the conference, the Court of 
Appeal’s Pratten decision had not yet come out. One of the most intense moments of the 
conference occurred in the context of this debate, when we showed Canadian filmmaker Barry 
Stevens’s documentary film Biodad, and followed it with a conversation between the filmmaker 
and the audience.14 The movie documents Stevens’s search for the identity of his biological 
father. Stevens was one of the first persons to be created through AHR, at a time when the 
technology was entirely unregulated and concerns about the desire to know one’s “biological 
identity” and the privacy implications of gamete donation were not on anyone’s radar. The 
debate in the wake of the Pratten decision highlights in an interesting way how new concerns 
may arise in relation to AHR that were not imagined at the time the technology was introduced. 
A detailed discussion of the Pratten decision seemed key to this book. 
Another important regulatory development relates to the funding of AHR. In late 2014, 
the Government of Quebec introduced a bill that, among other things, would eliminate IVF 
funding in the health care system and prohibit women younger than eighteen and older than 
forty-two from undergoing IVF.15 Some of our chapters refer to these developments and discuss 




Law’s Struggle with the Possibilities Created by 
New Technology 
The heart of the Reference and a unifying theme among the various chapters in this 
collection is how the law – both legislatures and courts – strives to understand and respond to the 
legal, ethical, and social ramifications of technological advancements. Assisted reproductive 
technologies, from artificial insemination to in vitro fertilization (IVF), surrogacy, and cloning, 
create situations that challenge basic assumptions about human relationships and that call into 
question the role of government regulation and the purpose of the health professions. When 
powers were first divided between the federal and provincial governments in 1867 – and for 
many years thereafter – there could be no meaningful consideration given to who should regulate 
technologies that were fantasy if not unimaginable. Similarly, it was once necessarily true that a 
newborn baby was the child of the woman who delivered it and a man who was sexually active 
with her nine months or somewhat less before, with adoption being the only situation where 
parent–child relations could be created outside the context of sexual relations. New reproductive 
technologies based on IVF created new opportunities for couples who could not naturally 
conceive, but it also created new challenges related to identity within a framework of parentage 
and privacy laws that remain founded on the assumption of natural reproduction. Most 
fundamentally, while all technology creates new possibilities, assisted reproductive technologies 
enable the creation of human life. In so doing, these technologies often harness the biology of 
existing humans, whether as sources of sperm and ova or as gestational carriers. This poses 
questions about participation in, access to, and the funding of AHR services. Particularly because 
of the costs of the technology and the considerable financial interests that have developed around 
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a booming commercial AHR industry – interests that include commercial sperm and ova banks, 
commercial surrogacy, consultancy firms, legal practitioners, and in vitro laboratories – AHR 
also raises questions about the commodification and commercialization of human life, in a way 
that few medical advancements have done before. 
The specific dispute that gave rise to the reference is, at one level, about federalism and 
the respective powers of the provincial and federal governments. At a more fundamental level, 
however, this constitutional question and the other legal issues turn on what exactly AHR is. Is it 
a fundamentally new activity, one that can give rise to evils that ought to be criminalized, or is it 
merely one more service that modern medicine can offer? If it is just part of the many other 
medical services that exist, can some of its challenges be regulated like any other medical 
activity? Does the fact that it touches on questions of personhood and identity, related to the 
importance and nature of biological origin and the importance of kinship relation, make it 
something unique in the context of medical practice? Are the concerns about potential 
exploitation and commodification special because AHR involves reproduction and future human 
beings? If so, is this a reason to develop firmer regulatory control? If regulatory control is 
required, is a unique, stricter regulatory system the way to go? If it is just a medical service, 
should it be considered a luxury or a basic medical need? Are regulation and perhaps even 
criminal law appropriate tools for imposing restraints on a technology that may offer boundless 
new applications? 
Like many stories of law reform, the history of AHR in Canada, and of the AHRA and the 
Reference in particular, is largely a story of delay and inaction. As with any issue, one option 
open to governments is to do nothing. This points to a peculiar limitation of federalism cases – 
the courts’ determination that one level of government has exceeded its jurisdiction and that only 
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another level of government can legislate in an area is no guarantee that those governments will 
actually do so. Such a determination does not compel them. The responsibility for this delay and 
inaction can be attributed, albeit unequally, to all branches of government at all levels. 
Interestingly, the constitutional challenge to the AHRA may even have provided the federal 
government at the time with an excuse not to move forward and implement the most basic 
regulatory structure, though it was legally able to do so. By not acting, the federal government 
may very well have given perfect ammunition to the critics of a strict regulatory approach for the 
demise of the legislative model it continues to publicly defend. 
Background to the Reference re: Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act and Constitutional Law 
and Federalism Perspectives 
The first part of this book introduces the context surrounding the Canadian Supreme 
Court reference and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, as well as the key constitutional and 
federalism issues raised by the case. Bernard M. Dickens provides a historical introduction to the 
Supreme Court’s decision and the AHRA itself. He details the referral of the legal issues raised 
by AHR to the Ontario Law Reform Commission in 1982; traces the work of the Commission 
alongside contemporary examinations in Australia and Britain; and notes the relative silence that 
greeted the release of the Commission’s report in 1985. Dickens then turns to the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, from its establishment by the Government of 
Canada in 1989 to the publication of its final report in 1993. By situating political and legal 
responses in the context of the developments as they happened, Dickens illuminates the 
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trepidation and controversy that these new realities invoked among the general public and the 
human context in which legislatures and courts operated. His account of these visceral public 
reactions and concerns over the implications of AHR provide a hint of the moral dimensions that 
dominated the reasons of McLachlin CJ in the AHRA Reference.  
The next three chapters explore the impact of the Reference on constitutional law at three 
different levels: the scope of the criminal law power, the implications of that scope for 
constitutional norms, and the boundaries of the federal government’s jurisdiction over health. In 
particular, they explore how AHR fits into and changes the historical division of powers between 
the federal and provincial governments. Ian B. Lee argues that the reasons in the AHRA 
Reference obscure the fundamental disagreement between the Chief Justice and Justices Lebel 
and Deschamps about what regulatory tools Parliament can validly employ to regulate various 
components of an activity that may only loosely be connected to an area of federal jurisdiction. 
He suggests that the decision is better understood as being not about the purpose of the impugned 
provisions, as the reasons nominally state, but instead about the means used to achieve that 
purpose. Interpreting the Reference in the context of previous decisions about the criminal law 
power, he argues that these provisions fell outside of that power because they included a 
licensure regime for a wide variety of activities related to AHR. He suggests that the repeal of 
the licensing elements by the 2012 amendments to the AHRA should therefore make these 
provisions a proper exercise of the criminal law power. 
Hoi L. Kong analyses the disagreements between the Chief Justice and Justices Lebel and 
Deschamps as they relate to the role of provincial autonomy. His focus is on how these two main 
sets of reasons understand the breath of the criminal law power and the scope of, and role for, the 
double aspect doctrine and the paramountcy doctrine. He identifies what he terms the norm of 
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non-suppression – that is, that there are several recognized federalism-related values, and that 
none of these values should be suppressed by courts. In contrast to the reasons of Justices Lebel 
and Deschamps, those of the Chief Justice violate this norm by suppressing the value of 
provincial autonomy in applying a criminal law power that is so broad as to remove any certainty 
over when the federal government will intervene in matters of provincial jurisdiction. 
Glenn Rivard evaluates the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision on the federal and 
provincial governments’ jurisdiction around health. As context for his analysis, he identifies the 
primary sources of federal powers related to health and the major legislation that draws on those 
sources. He emphasizes the federal government’s accepted role in product safety health risks via 
the criminal law power – risks such as those related to food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, 
human cell tissues and organs, and semen – and contrasts this with the accepted provincial role 
in regulating health professionals, services, and facilities. In this context, Rivard analyses the 
three sets of reasons in the AHRA Reference. He explains that Justices Lebel and Deschamps 
appear to narrow the established scope of the criminal law power in holding that public health 
risks are only an acceptable criminal law purpose where the thing being regulated – in this case, 
AHR – is an “evil” to be “suppressed.” He argues that although this narrowing could conceivably 
challenge long-standing and widely accepted federal control over product safety health risks, 
such an outcome is unlikely because those statutes have a more limited impact on provincial 
jurisdiction over health; indeed, the 2012 amendments to the AHRA make that Act more like 
those other statutes. 
Together, these four chapters comprise a reflection not only on the scope of the federal 
criminal law power, but also on the legitimate dimensions of government regulation against 
moral harms and the role of public outcry as a motivator for lawmaking. They also demonstrate 
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the challenge of situating AHR, a development with truly transformative impacts, in the context 
of previous and largely more mundane jurisdictional disputes between the federal and provincial 
levels of government. 
Family Law and Children’s Rights Perspectives 
The next part of the book focuses on the family law implications of assisted human 
reproduction and children’s rights. The first part grappled with how AHR impacts long-standing 
legal concepts around the federal and provincial division of powers; this next part addresses 
AHR’s challenge to the basic social and legal concepts of parent and child. Fundamentally, these 
are questions about the relationships and responsibilities among children born through AHR, the 
persons providing gametes or surrogacy, and the persons who intend to raise the children. Which 
of these persons are parents, with all the implications that that legal status brings, and which – if 
any – have informational obligations to the child? Can adoption law provide a template to 
address these issues, or is AHR ultimately too different? Among the unproclaimed provisions 
struck down in the AHRA Reference and subsequently repealed were those on the collection, 
disclosure, and use of health information in the context of AHR. It now falls to the provincial 
legislatures, or potentially the courts, to fill this legal gap, whether by replicating the policy 
choices made by Parliament or by rejecting them. A particularly serious question is whether, and 
under what circumstances and conditions, donor-conceived offspring will have access to 
knowledge of and information about their origins. A related challenge at the provincial level is to 
address the role of gamete donors and surrogates in parentage law. This second part of the book 
approaches these issues from a variety of perspectives. 
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Carol Rogerson considers an urgent legislative challenge facing provincial governments: 
the need to modernize parentage laws to explicitly address parenthood where children are born 
using gamete donation or surrogacy. She argues that while tools such as social parenthood 
(recognizing persons standing in the place of a parent, i.e., in loco parentis), birth registration, 
and adoption may give some level of recognition to intended parents, these are not substitutes for 
the certainty and stability of established legal status as parents from birth. Moreover, she 
illustrates how the statutory emphasis on biological and genetic parenthood may indeed give 
gamete donors or surrogates unplanned and/or unwanted parental status. Rogerson concludes by 
assessing the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s Uniform Child Status Act, 2010 and related 
legislation in British Columbia as precedents for future provincial action in this area. 
Michelle Giroux and Cheryl Milne illustrate another need for provincial legislation with a 
critique of Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General), in which the BC Court of Appeal 
rejected arguments for donor-conceived offspring’s right to know their genetic origins under 
sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. Giroux and Milne illustrate the negative implications of the 
court’s holding that the section 15(1) violation – that donor-conceived offspring are 
discriminated against as compared to adopted children, who can access information about their 
biological parents – was saved by the ameliorative-purpose exception in section 15(2). They also 
argue that the court was overly dismissive of the section 7 claim, given the physical and mental 
health implications for the liberty and security of the person of donor offspring, as recognized by 
the trial judge’s findings of fact. In particular, they argue that the court erred in rejecting the 
persuasiveness of related decisions applying the European Convention on Human Rights and in 
suggesting that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child does not impact provincial 
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governments because they are not directly parties to it. Given the holdings in Pratten, Giroux 
and Milne conclude that these issues will require legislation by the provinces. 
Vanessa Gruben explores in more detail the potential for donor-conceived offspring to 
successfully claim a right to knowledge of their genetic origins under section 7 of the Charter, 
despite the rejection of such a claim in Pratten. She acknowledges that a right to know one’s 
origin would be a positive right and that no positive rights have yet been recognized under 
section 7. She explains several potential interpretations of a right to know, including access to a 
donor’s identity and personal health information, and how such a right would raise complex 
privacy issues for donors, donor-conceived offspring, and others. While she argues that donor 
anonymity should be abolished and that donor-conceived offspring should have access to donor 
information, like Giroux and Milne she concludes that those changes are more likely to be made 
by legislatures than by courts. 
If legislatures are the appropriate vehicle for determining the scope of access to 
information for children born through AHR, the next question must be what form that legislation 
should take. The remaining three chapters in this part examine this question from various 
perspectives. Juliet R. Guichon explores the suitability of provincial and territorial adoption 
legislation as a model. She begins by assessing the health impacts of secrecy and donor 
anonymity for donor-conceived offspring, drawing on recent new research to establish the 
pronounced psychological and psychosocial effects. In this context, she considers the various 
adoption regimes used across Canada, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of their access-
to-information provisions and how those provisions could be applied to the context of donor 
conception. She identifies a mutual consent registry – in which identifying information is 
released to offspring only if the donor consents – as the minimum appropriate response. 
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Jeanne Snelling argues that New Zealand law provides a desirable model for Canadian 
provinces to legislate access to donor identity and other information by donor-conceived 
offspring. She notes that while the AHRA and the corresponding New Zealand legislation share 
similar principles and histories, the former facilitated anonymity while the latter provides donor-
conceived offspring (or their guardians) with both non-identifying and identifying information 
about their donors. However, she also acknowledges several weaknesses in New Zealand law – 
in particular, because there are no provisions to annotate birth certificates to indicate donor 
conception, some offspring may not know they are donor-conceived at all. 
Jennifer Speirs considers the impact of donor anonymity and corresponding legislation in 
the broader context of AHR regulation in the United Kingdom. Her focus is on the attitudes of 
past anonymous semen donors, including how they felt their attitudes had changed in the 
intervening years. She considers the role of payments for sperm donation and the ways in which 
that money potentially changes the relationships among donors, clinicians, and offspring. She 
also explores the mix of apprehension, curiosity, and ambivalence that donors feel when it comes 
to meeting their offspring. Using these issues as a base, Speirs then canvasses the key features of 
present-day legislative schemes in the UK that govern AHR – specifically, donor anonymity and 
payment for gametes. She concludes by reflecting on how approaches towards donor-conceived 
offspring’s access to information about their genetic parents have been and may continue to be 
informed by UK adoption legislation. 
Together, the chapters of this part illustrate the need for provincial legislative action to 
update and adapt existing family law concepts and regimes in light of the new realities created by 
AHR. In so doing, they also illustrate the functionality and limitations of the courts as a 
substitute vehicle to address these issues. By exploring analogous legislation not only from 
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Canadian jurisdictions but also from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, these chapters provide 
a rich exploration of many approaches from which the provinces might choose. At the same 
time, they also provide a compelling reminder of the human impact of continued inaction. 
Commodification and Commercialization of AHR, 
Access and Funding of AHR, and the Role of 
Law 
The final part of this book is devoted to issues around the provision of AHR services. 
These services challenge fundamental assumptions about the nature of disease and medical 
services, the proper distribution of public and private resources, and the appropriate role for 
domestic and global government regulation in combatting perceived harms. These chapters 
explore the dimensions of this challenge as it applies to commercialization and commodification, 
reproductive tourism, the role for the private sector in service delivery, access and 
discrimination, and public funding. 
Lisa C. Ikemoto contrasts the Canadian and American experiences around the 
commercialization of assisted reproduction and the resulting implications for reproductive 
tourism. She traces the AHRA’s ban on payments for gametes and surrogacy to the Royal 
Commission’s concerns about not only coercion and exploitation of vulnerable groups, but also 
the more general commodification of human life. She explains how these concerns have gained 
little traction among the American public and lawmakers in most states, and attributes this 
inattention to an emphasis on individual choice and free-market principles, combined with 
commercial providers’ portrayal of themselves as compassionately facilitating the growth of 
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happy and complete families. In this context, she illustrates how some American states have 
become magnets for those reproductive tourists who are willing and able to pay, particularly 
those from jurisdictions – such as Canada – where there are strong restrictions or prohibitions on 
the industry. 
Susan G. Drummond argues that provincial law should be amended to recognize the 
enforceability of gestational surrogacy contracts. She illustrates the continuing dominance of the 
traditional approach to maternal parentage, under which the mother is the woman who gives 
birth to the child, and details the variation among the provinces as to the likely legal impact of a 
surrogacy contract. She demonstrates how the absolute rule in the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada’s Uniform Child Status Act, 2010 – that surrogacy contracts are explicitly unenforceable 
– can paradoxically create a range of uncertainties and potentially undesirable outcomes for both 
the carrier and the intended parents. In contrast, she claims that enforceable surrogacy contracts 
would provide a more desirable distribution of risk. Finally, she argues that the existing 
empirical evidence, including as it relates to commodification, psychological impacts on 
children, and exploitation of vulnerable carriers, does not support the policy concerns about 
enforceability. Her critique of the criminal prohibition on commercialization contrasts in an 
interesting way with Ikemoto’s sketch of the moral hazards associated with the untrammelled 
commercialization that currently dominates AHR in the United States. One question to ask when 
reading these two chapters is whether we are really talking here about two opposing models. As 
pointed out earlier, the Canadian regulatory scheme has never really been reasonably 
implemented, and we may therefore not have a good picture of how a well-designed regulatory 
system could address some of the concerns of both Ikemoto and Drummond. Nevertheless, here 
an American scholar faced with untrammelled marketing in the American context is calling for 
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what looks like a more Canadian regulatory restriction on commercialization to tackle 
exploitation, whereas a Canadian scholar rejects the concerns about commercialization and 
commodification and is calling for a lifting of the Canadian restrictions, in part out of concerns 
for women’s rights. 
Stu Marvel and colleagues survey the special challenges facing LGBTQ people seeking 
access to assisted reproduction. They begin by noting that although the AHRA includes a 
principle of non-discrimination that specifically contemplates sexual orientation, the AHRA 
Reference itself refers to LGBTQ people only once. This inattention is particularly problematic 
because the current legal environment imposes barriers that disproportionately affect LGBTQ 
people. The supply of gametes is limited, due in part to the AHRA’s prohibition on gamete 
purchase. The use of known semen donors is more expensive and time-intensive than it may be 
for heterosexual couples, as there can be no exemption from the processing requirements if the 
donor is not the recipient’s spouse or sexual partner; moreover, special authorization is required 
if the known donor is gay, and will be denied if he is HIV positive. The prohibition on paid 
surrogacy presents an analogous barrier, particularly for gay men. These legal barriers exist 
alongside institutional attitudes in fertility clinics that focus on the needs of infertile heterosexual 
families. 
Colleen M. Flood, Ryann Atkins, and Bryan Thomas critique the regulation of IVF 
facilities and services after the AHRA Reference. They argue that current legal regimes 
insufficiently address quality and safety issues as well as the potential for financial exploitation 
of IVF patients. These risks are exacerbated because IVF is largely offered by private for-profit 
facilities and is typically not covered by public or private health insurance. Flood and colleagues 
review the existing literature comparing health outcomes in for-profit and not-for-profit facilities 
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and argue that the potential weakness of for-profit care warrants careful consideration in the IVF 
context. They also explain how the commercial approach may create conflicts of interest that 
could result in financial exploitation. They compare the regulatory environment in Ontario, 
where IVF is regulated by the same general statutes and regulations that apply to health 
professions and other medical services, to the one in Quebec, which has adopted several 
additional legal tools specific to IVF. They argue that both regimes have significant deficiencies. 
Finally, they explore how the AHRA’s remaining prohibitions on payments for gametes and 
surrogacy, as well as the regulatory restrictions on embryo implantation in Quebec, tend to 
impede reproductive freedom. 
Sarah Hudson assesses how a rights-based approach might support the funding of assisted 
reproduction under public health insurance. She explores the relationships among the concept of 
medical necessity under the Canada Health Act, the role of costs in determining health care 
priorities, and a narrow, illness-based concept of infertility that prioritizes the claims of 
heterosexual couples over those of singles and LGBTQ couples. In this context, she evaluates 
past and potential Charter claims for funding. She demonstrates that while claims to positive 
rights to reproductive autonomy or health care under section 7 would likely fail, discrimination 
claims under section 15 would have more promise, where some reproductive funding was 
already covered; however, much turns on the definition of infertility and the purpose of health 
care services. She concludes that anti-discrimination rights, as opposed to a free-standing right to 
reproductive assistance, have a major role to play in policy-making in this area. 
Trudo Lemmens explores the arguments invoked in the debate over the commodification 
of human reproductive material. Building on Margaret Radin’s market inalienability approach 
and referring also to the work of others who have emphasized the special issues raised in the 
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context of reproduction and the special nature of reproductive goods, Lemmens argues that 
criminal sanctions restricting the commercialization of gametes are legitimate and aim at 
confirming a richer concept of individual autonomy and at protecting human dignity. He 
suggests that regardless of changes in how we value AHR itself, reproductive goods should 
continue to be awarded special status and special protection outside the commercial market. 
Among the reasons for special treatment, Lemmens focuses in particular on the inherent 
relational nature of reproductive goods, the profound link to identity and personhood, and equity. 
The impact of commercialization on societal values associated with reproductive goods justifies, 
in his view, an approach that rejects untrammelled commercialization but allows for some level 
of state-organized compensation. Lemmens connects this discussion to a brief rebuttal of those 
who have argued that a prohibition on the sale of gametes violates Charter rights such as the 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right to equality. 
Together, the chapters in this part examine how value judgments embodied in law, 
specifically as they relate to the distribution and regulation of health resources, should be 
rethought in light of the challenges posed by AHR. These new technological possibilities place 
stress on the Canadian social consensus – to the extent that such consensus does indeed exist – as 
well as on health services with regard to the degree to which those services should be 
commercialized. As with the previous parts of the book, the focus here is on how AHR has 
pressured legislatures and courts to reconsider long-standing legal concepts, in this case about 
the inherent and commercial value of human life and its component prerequisites. 
Appendix: Expert Reports 
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As addenda, this book offers two expert opinion reports that were prepared in the context 
of the AHRA Reference decisions. The Quebec government commissioned an expert report to 
support its position on the AHRA at the Quebec Court of Appeal; the Canadian government did 
the same. These reports, which have not been published elsewhere, are valuable companions to 
the body of this book, as they reflect well the divergent opinions that exist in Canada with 
respect to the desirability of federal legislation in this area. 
Françoise Baylis provides an excerpt of her report for the federal government. Her 
overarching message is that the need for national uniformity makes essential the federal 
regulation of AHR in the interests of public health and safety and public morality. Variation 
among the provinces would not only promote reproductive and research tourism to jurisdictions 
with laxer standards but also allow potential harm to Canadian social values through coercion, 
exploitation, and commodification. Moreover, she argues that regulation via a single specialized 
federal agency – Assisted Human Reproduction Canada – would minimize the shortcomings 
arising from regulatory collaboration by several existing bodies within each province. Finally, 
she emphasizes the appropriateness of the ethical principles underlying the AHRA, tracing them 
back to the parallel principles identified by the Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
in its national consultations. 
The report for the Government of Quebec by Bartha Maria Knoppers and Élodie Petit is 
reproduced in full in English translation. In contrast to Baylis, Knoppers and Petit do not focus 
on the differential impacts and effectiveness of federal versus provincial action around AHR; 
rather, they emphasize Quebec’s long-standing and continuously evolving approach to regulating 
this area. They explain how and why this approach involves dynamic collaboration among the 
provincial government and government agencies, professional organizations, research ethics 
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committees, and the provincial agency that funds health research. They then detail how this 
approach has addressed some of the major issues raised by assisted human reproductive 
technologies, including consent, commercialization, and research oversight, and argue that this 
approach has made Quebec a leader both nationally and internationally. The foreword to the 
report, although brief, may be of particular interest. There, Knoppers draws on her experience as 
a member of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies to identify the 
limitations facing the Commission. She also emphasizes the irreconcilable conflicts among the 
Commission’s members and the corresponding need for compromise in its work. These notes are 
illuminating, given the prominent role of the Commission’s report for commentary about AHR 
and about portions of the reasons in the AHRA Reference itself. 
Conclusion 
In the wake of the AHRA Reference, the Parliament of Canada and the provincial 
legislatures face myriad challenging decisions. With the federalism aspect settled by the 
Supreme Court, both levels of government have one less excuse for further inaction. The delay to 
date, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision, has created substantial uncertainty for 
people seeking to use or participate in AHR services and for those health professionals and 
entrepreneurs who are willing to provide them. As the chapters in this book demonstrate, the 
complexities involved span a huge range and pose a real danger of unintended consequences. 
What ties these challenges together is the dramatic extent to which they require re-examination 
and adaptation of existing legal norms and structures to address previously impossible 
circumstances. Governmental action in these areas must be prompt, but it must also be informed 
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and deliberate. The largest issues – the regulation of AHR services, the legal identity and rights 
of people conceived using these services, the rise of reproductive tourism, and the 
commercialization of reproduction itself – are the same ones facing politicians, policy-makers, 
and academics in many countries. While there may be room for a variety of reasonable responses 
to these issues, progress in any jurisdiction will continue to be undermined by inaction 
elsewhere. This book offers a rich reflection on these questions and will help create space for 
further discussion and deliberation among those involved in or being affected by the governance 
and practice of assisted human reproduction. 
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